Follow-ups - FiMED

In recent months, Turkey has been moving on more than one regional front, in an effort to rearrange its military, security and diplomatic relations, in a way that could give Ankara wider room for manoeuvre in the eastern Mediterranean and, in turn, is raising growing concern in Israel. From military rapprochement with Egypt to political openness in eastern Libya, by way of the Kurdish files in Iraq and Syria, Ankara appears to be working to loosen the restrictions that have limited its regional ambitions in past years.

An analysis published by" Yedioth Ahronoth" by writer Amine Ayoub, a researcher at the Middle East Forum and a political analyst based in Morocco, argues that these developments, despite their different tracks, all point in one direction: expanding Turkey's margin for manoeuvre, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean, which compels Israel to reassess its security and strategic calculations in the region.

The analysis cites the joint naval exercises between Egypt and Turkey off the coast of Alexandria, under the name «Bahr al-Sadaqa 2026» (Sea of Friendship 2026), which include drills in naval combat, anti-submarine warfare and air defence, alongside exercises for naval special forces, and are due to conclude on 9 November.

These exercises gain additional significance as the second round of joint naval drills since they resumed in September 2025, after a 13-year hiatus. They also come in the context of a gradual rapprochement between Cairo and Ankara, which has included joint air exercises this year, a letter of intent for cooperation in the defence industries and the development of military capabilities, as well as an export and industrial cooperation agreement worth $350 million, signed by the Turkish Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation «MKE» with the Egyptian side, according to the analysis.

However, Ayoub stresses that this rapprochement does not mean Egypt has become an ally of Turkey, as Cairo still views Ankara's regional ambitions with caution, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean and Libya, where the two countries' interests intersect and compete.

Libya: a Turkish political gain that worries Israel

The analysis places the Libyan development at the forefront of the shifts strengthening Turkey's regional position, noting that the Libyan parliament in the east has ratified the maritime memorandum of understanding signed between Ankara and the Government of National Accord in 2019, after years of opposing the agreement.

The decision drew objections from Greece, Egypt and Israel. The Greek Foreign Ministry described the memorandum as illegal and void, Cairo refused to vote, and Israel condemned the step as infringing on the rights of its regional partners.

Senior defence officials from Israel, Greece and Cyprus also held a meeting in Athens on Thursday, during which they affirmed their rejection of the agreement, considering that it infringes on the sovereign rights of third countries and has no legal effect for them, and they agreed to establish a joint working group in the field of defence industries.

On the other hand, the writer believes that these positions, despite their political importance, are not sufficient on their own to counter the Turkish move, especially since the Libyan parliament's ratification represents, in his assessment, a new political opening for Ankara in eastern Libya that was not available to it weeks ago.

The analysis also points to a parallel Egyptian move, represented by the reopening of the historic headquarters of the Egyptian embassy in Tripoli, closed since 2014, despite Cairo resuming its diplomatic activity in the city in 2021. Egyptian officials also discussed trade, investment and energy files with the Libyan government in the west of the country, in a step reflecting Cairo's endeavour to protect its Libyan interests away from the path of rapprochement with Ankara.

The Kurdish file: easing a strategic burden on Ankara

On the domestic and regional front, the analysis addresses the course of Turkey's conflict with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which announced more than a year ago its intention to dissolve itself and lay down arms, following a call from its founder, Abdullah Öcalan.

Although the Turkish foreign minister announced last September that concrete disarmament steps had not yet been achieved, Turkish security sources monitored a limited withdrawal of the party's fighters from four shelters in the Matina area of northern Iraq on 8 October, the first field move of its kind in months, but one that does not, according to the analysis, constitute sufficient evidence that the disarmament process has been completed.

In this context, the Turkish parliament approved a law permitting the suspension of certain investigations and judicial prosecutions and the postponement of the execution of specific rulings, on condition that the security institutions confirm that the party has ended its activity and handed over its weapons, with the National Security Council to subsequently endorse this assessment by a decision published in the Official Gazette.

It was also announced in late October that a parliamentary committee had been formed to monitor the process, comprising representatives of different parties, but the final legal conditions for activating the measures have not yet been met.

The writer considers that the success of this process, if achieved, will relieve Turkey of a security and military burden that has drained its resources and attention for four decades. This does not mean, according to the analysis, that Ankara will direct additional forces toward Israel, but it could free up part of its capabilities and resources and give its leadership greater scope to focus on files beyond its borders.

Iraq.. A gradual end to a contentious military presence

In Iraq, the analysis points to a Turkish-Iraqi understanding reached on 23 September regarding the gradual handover of the Bashiqa-Zelikan base near Mosul, whose Turkish military presence had been a source of tension between the two countries for more than a decade.

A joint statement issued on 8 November confirmed that Ankara would begin the necessary steps to gradually transfer the base to the Iraqi federal government, in parallel with activating the joint security coordination committee to monitor developments in Sinjar, where Baghdad is working to subject the elements of the Yazidi Sinjar Resistance Units to federal military authority.

The understanding does not include a final deadline for handing over the base, nor does it mean the end of the Turkish military presence in Iraq, as Ankara still has other bases and positions inside Iraqi territory.

However, Ayoub believes that the new arrangement may allow Turkey to rid itself of a politically costly military position while continuing to pursue its security priorities through direct coordination with Baghdad, especially with regard to the activity of the Kurdistan Workers' Party in Sinjar.

Syria.. The end of the Syrian Democratic Forces' independent military power

The most prominent shift, according to the analysis, is in northeastern Syria, where the military operation launched by the Syrian government last January led to its control over vast areas that had been under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces «SDF«.

The writer notes that the forces' commander, Mazloum Abdi, announced in August that the SDF's mission had ended and that it was no longer an independent military force, after its fighters were integrated into brigades affiliated with the Syrian army.

This development is an important shift for Ankara, which has long regarded the independent Kurdish military structure on its southern border as a threat linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party. One of the most prominent security challenges Turkey faced in Syria has thus receded, without the need to launch a direct Turkish military operation to end this presence in its previous form.

Nevertheless, fundamental questions remain regarding the political rights of the Kurds, local administration, the nature of actual control over the units that were integrated into the Syrian army, and the extent of their military decision-making independence.

The Eastern Mediterranean.. The wider space for Turkish movement

Ayoub brings these developments together within a broader strategic reading, namely that Turkey is moving in parallel along several tracks: it is strengthening its military cooperation with Egypt despite continued rivalry with it, achieving a political opening in eastern Libya, approaching a possible settlement of its long conflict with the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and rearranging its military presence in Iraq, while the map of military control in northeastern Syria is changing.

The writer believes that a decline in some of these burdens could give President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan more room to focus on his country's ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean, where maritime boundaries, gas fields, energy facilities, export pipelines, submarine cables and trade corridors all intersect.

The analysis does not go so far as to say that these developments prove Turkey is prepared for a direct military confrontation with Israel, and it acknowledges that economic constraints and domestic priorities limit Ankara's ability to act without calculation. But it warns that the accumulation of shifts could change the balance of regional movement and give Turkey additional tools of influence in a region where Turkish, Israeli, Greek, Cypriot and Egyptian interests overlap.

Ayoub concludes that the Israeli response should not be limited to joint political statements with Greece and Cyprus but requires, in his view, the development of continuous maritime surveillance systems, enhanced intelligence-sharing, and the establishment of sustainable defense and industrial projects, alongside maintaining channels of communication with Cairo.

The writer warns against treating Egypt and Turkey as a single bloc, noting that Cairo's rejection of the Libyan maritime memorandum was not support for Israel but an expression of Egypt's own interests, which allows Tel Aviv, in his assessment, to continue communicating with Cairo despite the joint military maneuvers between Egypt and Ankara.

The analysis concludes by noting that none of the four files (Libya, northern Iraq, the Turkish base near Mosul, and the military shifts in northeastern Syria) originated with Israel, but all of them, according to the writer's reading, are reflected in its regional calculations. Every file Erdoğan comes closer to settling may give him more space to open other files, and the Eastern Mediterranean appears to be the most prominent arena toward which that space could turn.