FiMED – Follow-up

Israeli newspaper Globes has revealed that the Israeli intelligence system known as "Hatsav", which specialises in gathering and analysing information available from open sources, has been rebuilt after the unit was closed in its previous form in 2021. The paper said the new system became operational in January 2026, with a major increase in resources, manpower and technical equipment.

The information reported by the paper highlights a growing shift within Israeli military intelligence towards treating content published openly on the internet, including TikTok, Telegram, media outlets and social networks, as a source that can be turned into intelligence with operational uses.

From a small unit to an independent system

According to Globes, the "Hatsav" unit was closed in 2021, with some of its capabilities distributed among various research units and certain specialised capabilities retained within other units.

But the paper says the experience of the following years, especially the events of 7 October 2023, revived the question of the need for a specialised, central body that gathers open-source information, deciphers it and places it in an intelligence context.

Globes notes that after 7 October, the Israeli army discovered the importance of material published from inside the Gaza Strip, including photos, videos and posts circulated on social media, in an effort to locate Israeli captives and understand what was happening on the ground.

At the same time, the paper quoted a former Israeli security official as saying the problem was not necessarily a lack of information, but how it was interpreted within the intelligence establishment, given what he described as the persistence of the "concept" that governed the establishment's assessments before the 7 October attack.

Rebuilding "Hatsav"

According to the report, in early 2023 the Israeli army began work on a training and information system called "Netivot" to develop researchers' ability to handle open-source intelligence.

But the outbreak of the Gaza war in October 2023 came before the project had been completed or reached the required operational stage.

In January 2026, the new system became an independent operational body reporting directly to the Military Intelligence Directorate, with more autonomous status and greater technical capabilities and human resources.

Globes says manpower in the new version is three times the size of the unit closed in 2021, alongside increased investment in technology, particularly artificial intelligence.

TikTok and Telegram as intelligence sources

The paper reveals that the new system does not merely monitor news and traditional sources, but gathers information from a wide range of digital platforms. According to the report, these sources include TikTok, Telegram, news websites, accounts and social networks, as well as photos and videos posted by users.

The task is not only to collect posts, but to analyse them and link them with other information in order to produce a more comprehensive intelligence picture.

Globes says some of the information extracted from open sources can reach the tactical level, including helping to identify military targets.

Photos from Iran become operational information

The report cites an example from the war with Iran, where, according to sources who spoke to the paper, photos posted by Iranian soldiers from military bases helped build an intelligence picture that contributed to identifying hundreds of targets. The paper links this information to subsequent Israeli operations, including the targeting of Iranian military officials.

This highlights one of the most important functions of open-source intelligence: turning material published for the public into information that can be combined with other intelligence sources.

AI does not eliminate the human element

Despite growing investment in artificial intelligence, Globes quotes an official in the Israeli intelligence community as saying the establishment does not regard technology as a substitute for people. The source points to the importance of understanding language, culture and the political and religious context when analysing information, especially in environments with multiple sources full of contradictory information and influence campaigns.

The difficulty is that an open source does not necessarily mean the information is accurate: posts may be part of a disinformation campaign, propaganda or a deliberate attempt to influence the audience. The analysis process therefore relies on verifying the source, understanding its background and comparing what it publishes with other sources before feeding it into the intelligence picture.

From the strategic level to the battlefield

According to the paper, the new system's role is not limited to preparing strategic assessments but extends to the tactical level linked to running military operations. This means a photo, a video or a social media post can acquire a different intelligence value when linked to other geographic, military or time-based information.

Globes quotes an intelligence official as saying that knowledge produced by open-source intelligence is now present at both the strategic and tactical levels.

The lesson of 7 October: the information was there, but how was it read?

The Israeli piece offers an important glimpse of the security establishment's reviews after 7 October. The report notes that in the years before the attack, Hamas had published footage of military drills that included simulations of breaching the fence, seizing positions, using drones, and landing and combat operations.

It also points to Palestinian speeches and media material that openly discussed scenarios of a wide-scale confrontation with Israel. Yet this material did not translate into an intelligence assessment that identified the timing of the attack or prevented it.

Globes quotes a former security official as saying the problem ran deeper than a mere lack of information, and that open-source information alone could not change the prevailing perception within the establishment.

This point matters: the presence of information in the public domain does not necessarily mean the intelligence establishment will interpret it correctly or give it the weight it requires.

Intelligence watching the digital space

The return of "Hatsav" in its new form reveals a shift in the nature of Israeli intelligence work: social networks are no longer merely a media or social space, but part of the information-gathering environment. This means posts, photos and videos available to the public can feed into processes of analysis, comparison and linking events, alongside covert intelligence sources.

The report itself, however, highlights the limits of this capability, stressing the need to distinguish genuine information from misleading information, to understand the context in which it emerged, and not to treat artificial intelligence as a substitute for human analysis.

Conclusion

The Globes report shows that, after the experience of 7 October, Israel is reshaping open-source intelligence by creating a larger, more autonomous system, backed by technology and artificial intelligence and capable of handling huge volumes of digital content.

Notably, according to the Israeli account, TikTok, Telegram and other platforms are no longer merely sources for monitoring public opinion, but have become part of the intelligence production chain, which can reach the operational level.

At the same time, the experience of 7 October shows that the intelligence problem is not always about the absence of information, but can also be about how it is read, connected and given appropriate weight in the decision-making process.